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•	 The	 ‘turn	 to	 the	 East’	 in	 Russian	 foreign	 policy	 announced	











so	 far	 limited)	 of	 Russian	 foreign	 policy,	which	 is	 gradually	
becoming	less	‘West-centric’.	This	diversification	has	allowed	
the	Russian	political	 elite	 to	avoid	a	 feeling	of	 isolation	dur-










•	 Moscow’s	 response	 to	 the	 challenge	 posed	 to	 Russia	 by	 the	
rise	of	Chinese	power	consists	of	three	complementary	com-
ponents:	the	continued	development	and	enhancement	of	co-	
-operation	 with	 China,	 especially	 in	 the	 energy	 sector;	 at-
tempts	 to	 diversify	 economic	 ties	 and	 political	 contacts	
through	intensifying	relations	with	other	Asian	countries;	and	




























































i. thE intEnsification of rElations with 








from	 the	Asia-Pacific	 region,	 and	 strengthening	Russia’s	 role	 in	
regional	 organisations.	 Medvedev	 ordered	 the	 development	 of	






Russia	 should	 be	 transformed	 into	 a	 ‘European-Pacific’	 state2.	
At	 the	 same	 time	 the	 term	 ‘turn	 to	 the	East’	 (povorot/razvorot)3,	
began	 to	 appear	 in	 Russian	 foreign	 policy	 discourse,	 signalling	
a	radical	change	in	Russian	foreign	policy.	As	one	Russian	expert	
put	it,	Russia	“has	set	itself	the	fundamental	goal	of	balancing	the	
1	 ‘Stenograficheskiy	 otchet	 o	 soveshchanii	 po	 sotsialno-ekonomichesko-
mu	 razvitiyu	 Dalnego	 Vostoka	 i	 sotrudnichestvu	 so	 stranami	 Aziatsko-	
-Tikhookeanskogo	 regiona’,	 pp.	 2,	 10;	 www.kremlin.ru/transcripts/8234.	






table’	 entitled	 ‘Russia’s	 Foreign	 Policy	 in	 the	 Pacific	 Region’	 held	 by	 the	

































attention	 to	 the	 Asian	 vector	 in	 Russia’s	 foreign	 policy,	 linking	


































inherited	 from	 Soviet	 times.	 In	 contrast,	 relations	 with	 Japan,	
which	–	given	its	security	alliance	with	the	United	States	–	was	
viewed	in	Moscow	as	an	integral	part	of	the	West,	remained	cool.	
Any	 fundamental	 improvement	 in	relations	was	blocked	by	 the	
unresolved	dispute	over	the	Kuril	Islands.	(These	islands	were	oc-
cupied	by	 the	Soviet	Union	during	World	War	 II,	 and	 Japan	has	
been	demanding	that	the	islands	be	returned	to	it	ever	since.)	










of	 the	global	economy	by	 increasing	 its	 share	 in	 industrial	pro-
duction,	trade	and	financial	assets,	at	the	expense	of	the	West.	As	




In	 the	 opinion	 of	 the	 Russian	 political	 elite,	 the	 economic	 rise	






9	 The	 authors	 of	 the	 collective	 report	 developed	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 the	
Russian	International	Affairs	Council	(which	at	present	is	the	leading	semi-


































Some	 Russian	 experts	 view	 East	 Asia	 as	 an	 attractive	 political	
model,	providing	an	alternative	to	that	of	the	West.	As	Vyacheslav	
Nikonov10,	a	leading	Russian	expert	in	international	affairs,	has	
said,	Asia	 today	 is	“the	most	 important	global	 testing	ground	of	
the	main	platform	for	global	international	relations	in	the	21st	century.	The	
global	order	and	its	most	important	component,	the	links	between	the	key	




Interesy	 Rossii	 v	 Aziatsko-Tikhookeanskom	Regione:	 Bezopasnost’	 i	 Raz-
vitiye’,	2012,	p.	18;	a	“sharpening	of	Chinese-US	contradictions	over	a	broad	
spectrum	 of	 issues”	 was	 also	 mentioned	 in	 another	 report	 from	 RSMD,	
‘Aziatsko-Tikhookeanskiye	Orientiry	Rossii	posle	sammita	ATES	vo	Vladi-
vostoke’,	2013,	p.	13.




































in	 terms	 of	Realpolitik,	which	 is	 characteristic	 of	 the	 post-Sovi-
et	political	elite.	For	 this	 reason,	 this	analysis	of	Russian	policy	






12	 Sergey	Karaganov,	Oleg	Barabanov,	Timofey	Bordachev,	K Velikomu Okeanu, 















ii. thE policy of EngagEmEnt – thE russian 
rEaction to thE risE of china’s powEr 




as	 frequently	as	he	does	with	 leaders	of	 the	People’s	Republic	of	



















13	 An	 interview	with	 the	 ambassador	 of	 the	 Russian	 Federation	 to	 Beijing,	
Andrey	Denisov;	http://www.rg.ru/2014/03/31/obmen.html	
14	 Calculated	on	the	basis	of	data	compiled	by	Yu	Bin	in	Comparative Connec-




-Russian	 Strategizing’	 in:	 Comparative Connections. A Triannual E-Journal 



























power	does	not	constitute	a	 threat	 to	Russia.	 In	November	2011,	




over	 this.	China	has	other	competitors	 in	 this	area.	So	 let	 them	








































(1)	 developing	 economic	 co-operation	 with	 China,	 especially	 in	
the	energy	sector;
(2)	 searching	 for	 a	 diversification	 of	 economic	 and	political	 ties	








to	 emphasise	 that	 economic	 co-operation	 is	 the	 foundation	 of	
Russian-Chinese	relations.	As	mentioned	already,	China	has	been	
Russia’s	largest	trade	partner	since	2010.	Bilateral	trade	has	been	
growing	 rapidly	 over	 the	 past	 few	 years	 (43%	 in	 2010,	 42.7%	 in	
2011,	11.2%	in	2012	and	1.7%	in	2013)	to	reach	a	volume	of	US$88.8	
19	 ‘Tikhookeanskaya	strategiya	Rossii’,	8	July	2010,	p.	6.









































2009 CNPC 2011-2030 180 65 15
2013 CNPC 2013-2038 360 270 60
2013* SINOPEC 2013-2023 100 85 20
*A	framework	agreement
As	 regards	 the	 gas	 sector,	 in	 contrast,	 larger-scale	 Chinese-
-Russian	 co-operation	 had	 until	 recently	 remained	 at	 the	 plan-
ning	 level.	 Russia	 would	 sporadically	 export	 relatively	 small	
21	 http://en.ria.ru/business/20130110/178687770/China-Russia_Trade_Up_11_
to_88_Bln_in.html;	10	January	2013.
















amounts	 of	 liquefied	natural	 gas	 to	China	under	 spot	 contracts	
(e.g.	around	500	million	m3	in	2012).	The	long-term,	30-year	con-
tract	signed	by	Gazprom	and	CNPC	on	21	May	2014	in	Shanghai,	
which	provides	 for	 supply	of	up	 to	38	bcm	of	natural	gas	annu-
ally	from	the	Kovykta	and	Chayanda	gas	fields	in	Eastern	Siberia,	
marked	a	real	breakthrough.	The	contract’s	total	value	stands	at	
US$400	billion,	and	envisages	a	 total	 supply	of	 1032	bcm	of	gas.	
Deliveries	are	planned	to	start	in	2018,	but	each	of	the	parties	has	
the	 right	 to	postpone	 the	 start	 of	deliveries	by	 two	years23.	The	
contract	provides	for	the	option	of	prepayment	at	US$25	billion24.	












namely	 Russia’s	 ongoing	 conflict	 with	 the	 West	 over	 Ukraine,	
and	 especially	 the	 associated	Western	 sanctions	 and	 the	 threat	

















































is	 planned	 to	 provide	 the	 natural	 gas	 to	 be	 supplied	 under	 the	 contract;	




28	 An	 intergovernmental	 agreement	 on	 the	 construction	 of	 two	 nuclear	 re-
actors	(worth	US$1.8	billion)	for	the	Tianwan	nuclear	power	plant	built	by	






























largest	 client	 of	 the	Russian	 arms	 industry.	 It	 can	be	 estimated	
on	the	basis	of	available	data	 that	 the	value	of	Russian	military	





The	 scope	 of	military-technical	 co-operation	between	Moscow	
and	Beijing	has	been	quite	narrow	over	the	past	few	years.	Rus-
sia	 exports	 mainly	 aircraft	 engines	 and	 helicopters.	 Further-
more,	 a	 programme	 envisaging	 the	 production	 in	 China	 on	





31	 Tsentr	 Analiza	 Mirovoy	 Torgovli	 Oruzhiyem,	 Kitay v strukture mirovogo 

























in	November	2013,	but	Russian	 sources	 reported	 in	September	
2013	 that	 this	would	 not	 happen	 before	 2014.	 The	 contract	 for	
submarine	 construction	 is	 expected	 to	 be	finalised	 in	 2015;	 its	
estimated	value	is	US$1.5	billion33.	
However,	 Chinese-Russian	 military	 co-operation	 extends	 far	
beyond	 the	 export	 of	Russian	 equipment	 and	 technologies.	 It	 is	









ships;	 and	 land	 exercises	 at	 the	 Chebarkul	 training	 ground	 in	
Russia.	The	Chinese	President	Xi	 Jinping’s	tour	of	the	command	
centre	of	the	Russian	armed	forces,	unprecedented	for	a	foreign	


















































a	 joint	 declaration	 a	 positive	 evaluation	 of	 each	 other’s	 flagship	
economic	integration	projects	in	the	region,	i.e.	Russia’s	Eurasian	
35	 See	for	example	the	reflections	in	the	memorandum	K Velikomu Okeanu, ili 
novaya globalizatsiya Rossii,	 pp.	 57–58	 and	60–61,	written	by	political	 ana-
lysts	closely	linked	to	the	Russian	establishment	and	published	under	the	
auspices	of	the	Valdai	Club.	











































iii. moscow–dElhi: a gEopolitical consEnsus




relations.	 To	 emphasise	 this	 state	 of	 affairs,	 Russian	 diplomacy	
refers	to	them	as	a	“specially	privileged	strategic	partnership”39.	
Russia	 and	 India	 have	 no	 conflicting	 interests	 in	 international	









which	 is	 closely	 linked	 to	 the	Russian	establishment,	 intimated	






the	 power	 of	 veto,	 as	 increasing	 the	 number	 of	 such	 countries	
would	mean	a	relative	weakening	of	Russia’s	own	position.	
Russia’s	economic	relations	with	India,	when	compared	with	Rus-
sia’s	 relations	 with	 China,	 display	 both	 similarities	 and	 differ-
ences.	What	is	similar	is	that	in	both	cases	it	is	the	energy	sector	
and	military-technical	cooperation	that	play	the	central	role.	The	
































supplies	 is	 around	US$3	billion.	The	 contracts	which	have	been	
signed	 and	 are	 currently	 being	 implemented	 are	worth	 around	
US$20	billion44.	
To	 no	 other	 country,	 except	 for	 India,	 does	 Russia	 sell	 equally	
advanced	 military	 technologies	 and	 an	 equally	 broad	 range	 of	
weapons,	from	small	arms	to	warships.	In	November	2013,	the	In-
dian	flag	was	hoisted	on	an	aircraft	carrier	bought	from	Russia,	
after	 it	 had	 been	 thoroughly	modernised	 and	 re-fitted.	 In	 2012,	
India	 leased	 a	Russian	nuclear-powered	 submarine.	Russia	 also	
supplies	 India	 with	 shipborne	 fighter	 jets	 (MiG-29K/KUB)	 and	
Mi-17B-5	transport	helicopters.	
Furthermore,	co-production	based	on	high	technologies	occupies	
a	 significant	 niche	 in	 the	 areas	 of	 both	 military-technical	 and	
41	 Torgovo-ekonomicheskoye sotrudnichestvo mezhdu Rossiyskoi Federatsiyei i Indiyei 
za 2012 g.,	http://www.ved.gov.ru/files/images/kai/TES_Rus_Ind_2012.pdf
42	 Tsentr	 Analiza	Mirovoy	 Torgovli	 Oruzhiyem,	 Osnovnyie programmy mod-
ernizatsii VS Indii v 2011-2012 gg.,	2012,	pp.	3-4.































During	 the	 most	 recent	 visit	 by	 then-PM	Manmohan	 Singh	 to	

























iv. russian-JapanEsE rElations: a fruitful 
‘stratEgic patiEncE’ 
Unlike	 the	 warm	 and	 close	 political	 contacts	 with	 Beijing	 and	
Delhi,	Moscow’s	 relations	with	 the	 third	 regional	Asian	power,	
Japan,	have	 long	been	 overshadowed	by	 the	unresolved	 territo-
rial	 dispute	 over	 the	 Kuril	 Islands.	 Russian-Japanese	 relations,	
albeit	 correct,	 have	 remained	 cold.	 The	 Russian	 side,	 following	
President	Putin’s	unsuccessful	attempt	in	2001	to	resolve	the	dis-
pute	through	a	compromise	based	on	the	joint	declaration	signed	














The	 Russian	 strategy	 has	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 successful.	 A	 ‘small	
breakthrough’	 regarding	 the	 disputed	 islands	 was	 seen	 dur-
ing	 the	 visit	 by	 Japan’s	 prime	minister,	 Shinzo	Abe,	 to	Moscow	
in	April	2013.	Given	the	growing	Chinese	threat,	 Japan	accepted	
the	 Russian	 terms	 for	 resolving	 the	 dispute:	 the	 parties	 agreed	

























improvement	 of	 relations	 between	Moscow	 and	 Tokyo,	 Russia’s	
foreign	 minister	 Sergey	 Lavrov	 characteristically	 denied	 out-















wood	and	maritime	products.	 In	turn,	most	of	 its	 imports	(85%)	
are	products	of	the	automotive,	machine-building	and	electronic	
industries.	



























lin-1	 (30%)	 and	Sakhalin-2	 (22.5%).	As	 a	 consequence,	 Japan	has	














50	 ‘O	 rossiysko-yaponskikh	 ekonomicheskikh	 otnosheniyakh’,	 7	 November	
2013;	http://www.russia-emb.jp/embassy/economic.html	

























that	his	 company	was	 ready	 to	provide	 Japanese	 investors	with	
access	to	its	oil	and	gas	fields	as	part	of	an	assets	swap57.	


















v. russia and thE multilatEral 
structurEs in thE rEgion
Moscow’s	 consistent	 efforts	 to	 join	 the	multilateral	 regional	 or-
ganisations,	 or	 establish	 a	 formal	 partnership	 with	 them	 (the	
















The	 only	major	Russian	 initiative	was	 the	 2010	 proposal	 to	 im-
































59	 Speech	by	 the	Russian	deputy	minister	 of	 foreign	 affairs,	 Igor	Morgulov,	
5	 July	2013;	http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/fa711a859c4b9396432569
99005bcbbc/9668ef80b55334ad44257b82003e03d0!OpenDocument;	 Speech	














































60	 See	 for	 example	 statements	 by	 Gennady	 Chufrin	 (IMEMO	 RAN),	 Sergey	



















The	Kremlin’s	 response	 to	 this	 situation	has	 been	 equally	 com-

















partners,	Moscow	has	been	aiming	at	achieving	 the	goal	 that	 it	
had	already	proclaimed	in	the	1990s:	 the	construction	of	a	new,	






ed	 in	 the	 statement	 from	 the	 Russian	 ambassador	 in	 Beijing,	 Sergey	 Ra-
























(i.e.	not	being	bound	by	 formal	 obligations	 as	 allies)	 and	zones	
of	influence,	mutual	non-interference	in	each	other’s	internal	af-
fairs,	refraining	from	‘exporting’	one’s	own	values	and	political	
systems,	 pragmatic	 economic	 co-operation	 (i.e.	without	 regard	
to	 any	 ideological	 restrictions),	 and	 the	 search	 for	 compromise	
in	regional	 issues.	 In	 its	 relations	with	Beijing	and	Delhi	alike,	
Moscow	 has	 emphasised	 the	 complete	 political	 harmony	 and	
similarity	of	interests	and	views	on	both	the	fundamental	rules	





impulses	 from	 the	 West.	 In	 practice	 this	 means	 coordinating	
their	positions	at	the	UN	and	other	international	organisations.	
For	example,	Russia	and	China	use	 their	veto	power	 in	 similar	
situations,	and	usually	jointly,	in	the	UN	Security	Council.	Over	
the	past	few	years	all	three	states	have	demonstrated	the	desire	
to	 create	 international	 formats	 and	 organisations:	 BRICS,	 the	
Shanghai	 Cooperation	 Organisation	 and	 RIC	 (trilateral	 Russia-
China-India	 consultations),	 with	 an	 intention	 of	 making	 them	
into	 alternatives	 to	 the	 institutions	 created	 and	 dominated	 by	
“the	West”.	Moscow	vests	particular	hopes	 in	 the	BRICS	 struc-
ture	as	a	“platform	for	promoting	a	non-Western	agenda”	in	the	
global	context62.	At	the	same	time,	all	three	countries	have	been	
pressing	 for	reform	of	 international	organisations	 like	 the	 IMF	
and	G20,	so	that	their	rules	of	operation	increasingly	correspond	
to	the	interests	of	the	new	non-Western	powers.	


























ing	 India)	 rose	 from	 17.1%	 to	 21.9%,	while	 the	European	Union’s	







































China,	 unlike	 its	 co-operation	with	Western	partners,	 does	not	
entail	 any	 political	 risk	 in	 the	 form	 of	 open	 or	 covert	 pressure	









The	 lack	of	a	 solid	economic	 foundation	may	mean	 that	 the	un-
doubted	 achievements	 of	 the	 Russian	 policy	 of	 ‘turning	 to	 the	
East’,	such	as	the	reinforcement	of	Russia’s	political	and	diplomat-
ic	position,	may	in	the	longer	term	prove	to	be	illusory.	
witold rodkiEwicz
